Abstract: Digital signature with proxy delegation, which is a secure ownership enforcement tool, allows an original signer to delegate signature rights to a third party called proxy, so that the proxy can sign messages on behalf of the original signer. Many real-world applications make use of this secure mechanism, e.g., digital property transfer. A traditional digital signature mechanism is required to bind a message and its signature together for verification. This may yield extra cost in bandwidth while the sizes of message and signature are relatively huge. Message recovery signature, enabling to reduce the cost of bandwidth, embeds a message into the corresponding signature; therefore, only the signature will be transmitted to the verifier and the message can further be recovered from the signature. In this paper, we, for the first time, propose a novel digital signature scheme in the identity-based context with proxy delegation and message recovery features and, more importantly, our scheme is quantum resistant, in a particular lattice-based signature. Our scheme achieves delegation information and signature existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen warrant and identity. Compared with the seminal lattice-based message recovery signature, our scheme is independent from public key infrastructure, realizes delegation transfer of signature rights, and compresses signature length ulteriorly. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first of its type.
Introduction
Digital signature aims at message authenticity, which can be verified by everyone with a message/signature pair. Considering the practical application, a digital signature also needs to have special properties for special functionality requirements, such as signature with delegation functionality-proxy signature. Proxy signature, which was first proposed by Mambo [1] , allows an original signer to delegate his signing right to a proxy signer, so that the proxy signer can sign a message on behalf of the original signer. Proxy signature is suitable for the case where the original signer is temporarily absent so that the proxy is delegated to make a signature on behalf of the original signer. It has many real-world applications (e.g., digital property transfer) and practical variants in the literature
Our Contribution
In this paper, we build an efficient and secure identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery in lattice-based cryptography. Our scheme is based on the lattice signature without trapdoors [21] . Inspired by the signature compression technique in [22] , we introduce the random error matrix E id with enough small entries, let (A|I)
S id E id = AS id + E id = H 1 (id). According to the learning with errors problem, we keep S id instead of (S id , E id ), as the secret key of user id. Correspondingly, the signature is S id c + y rather than (S id c + y, E id c + y) in our scheme. These operations add more randomness to user secret key extraction, and reduce signature length with E id c + y.
For proxy signature, we change the traditional idea that the original signer generates the delegated secret key and passes it to the proxy signer through the secure channel. Following the idea of two-party signature in [26] , our delegated secret key is obtained with the help of proxy signer's secret key and original signer's public delegation information. Therefore, delegated secret key extraction is controlled by the proxy signer and original signer, and no secure channel is required between them. Moreover, anyone can verify the validity of delegation information because it is public.
Speaking of message recovery, we adopt the technique in [23] . Compared with the scheme in [23] , our scheme takes the following three advantages. Firstly, our scheme is identity-based and does not rely on public key infrastructure maintenance. Secondly, our scheme realizes delegation transfer of signing rights. Thirdly, our scheme condenses signature length. The comparing details of two schemes are described in Section 5.
In addition, we divide the security definition in [11] into two factors: delegation information existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen warrant and identity, signature existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message and identity. The former guarantees delegation information is credible, and the latter guarantees that proxy signature is credible. Our security definition is more comprehensive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present an overview of background knowledge in Section 2. Then, we propose our model and security definitions for an identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide the identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery in lattice-based cryptography. Correctness, security, and performance analysis are discussed in Section 5. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
Preliminaries

Notations
Z is the set of integers, and N is the set of natural numbers. Let q be a polynomial-size prime number, Z q is the set of integers in (−q/2, q/2]. For a ∈ Z and
is the Euclidean norm of e, and e ∞ = max 1≤i≤m e (i) . For matrix T ∈ Z m×n , T(i, j) is the entry in i-th row and j-th column, T is the largest Euclidean norm of its column vectors, andT is its Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization. If s 1 and s 2 are two bit strings, s 1 ||s 2 is their concatenation, s 1 ⊕ s 2 is the result of xor computation. In addition, |s 1 | l 1 is the prefix of s 1 with length l 1 , |s 1 | l 2 is the suffix of s 1 with length l 2 .
Lattice Theory
In this subsection, basic concepts and major algorithms related to our scheme are illustrated. For readers who are interested in details, please see literature [19, 27, 28] . Definition 1. Algorithm TrapGen(q, m), with m ≥ 5n log q, outputs a pair (A, T) which satisfies the following conditions: 1. A ∈ Z n×m q follows uniform distribution with overwhelming probability; 2. T ∈ Z m×m , ||T|| ≤ O(n log q) and ||T|| ≤ O( n log q) 3. AT = 0(modq) Definition 2. D σ is a discrete Gaussian distribution on Z, with center 0 and standard deviation σ. D m×n σ is a matrix with m rows and n columns, and every entry in the matrix follows the distribution D σ . Definition 3. For A ∈ Z n×m q , a short basis T of Λ ⊥ q (A), u ∈ Z n q , and Gaussian parameter σ ≥ T · ω log m , algorithm SamplePre(A, T, u, σ) outputs some e ∈ Z m such that ||e|| ≤ σ √ m and Ae = u (modq).
Definition 4. Given a uniform random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , the small integer solution (SIS) problem is to find a short vector v ∈ Z m , such that Av = 0 (modq) and ||v|| ≤ β for some appropriate parameter β.
Definition 5. Given a pair A, A s + e , where A ∈ Z n×m q follows uniform distribution with overwhelming probability, s ← D n σ , e ← D m σ for appropriate parameter σ, the learning with errors (LWE) problem is to find s.
With appropriate parameters, LWE and SIS problems are notably hard average problems in lattice theory, and they are the security basis of most cryptographic systems in lattice.
Identity-Based Proxy Signature with Message Recovery
Our model and security definitions for an identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery (IDPSWM) come from the literature [11] , and two adjustments are made.
•
In our model, the delegation information is public, everyone may verify its legality; whereas, in [11] , the delegation information is sent to the proxy signer secretly, and only the proxy signer can verify its legality. Therefore, a secure channel is unnecessary to transmit delegation information in our model, and every user can verify delegation information legality.
To make it easier to understand, we divide scheme security into two factors: delegation information existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen warrant and identity (EUF-ID-CWA), signature existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message and identity (EUF-ID-CMA). EUF-ID-CWA security assures that delegation information is believable. EUF-ID-CMA security assures that signature is believable.
Our Model
There are three types of users: the original signer, the proxy signer, and the verifier, as well as a private key generator (PKG) in the system; their roles are as follows:
• Setup (n): PKG inputs the security parameter n, outputs system public parameters params and the system secret master key msk.
• KeyExtract (msk, id): Given an identity id, PKG makes use of the system secret master key msk and provides the secret key sk id for the identity id. If it is legal, the output is 1, the message is accepted; otherwise, the output is 0, and the message is rejected.
As to scheme correctness, seven algorithms should satisfy the following rules: For every security parameter n, (params,
Security Definitions
Scheme security includes two factors: delegation information existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen warrant and identity (EUF-ID-CWA), signature existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message and identity (EUF-ID-CMA).
EUF-ID-CWA
EUF-ID-CWA security is described by the next game between a challenger C and a forger F .
• Initial Phase: The challenger C runs Setup algorithm to get system public parameters params and the system secret master key msk. C returns params to the forger F and keeps msk himself.
•
Query Phase: The forger F makes the following queries adaptively with a polynomial bounded number, and the challenger C has the obligation to make reasonable answers.
1. KeyExtract (id): F selects a user identity id, sends it to the challenger C. C invokes algorithm KeyExtract (msk, id) to get the associated secret key sk id . Then, C returns sk id to F . Let ε 1 be the success probability of F in this game.
Definition 6.
An identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery (IDPSWM) is delegation information existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen warrant and identity (EUF-ID-CWA), if for every polynomial time forger F , ε 1 is negligible.
EUF-ID-CMA
EUF-ID-CMA security is demonstrated by the following game between a challenger C and a forger F .
• Initial Phase: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to get system public parameters params and the system secret master key msk. C returns params to the forger F and keeps msk secret.
•
Query Phase: The forger F executes the following queries adaptively with a polynomial bounded number, and the challenger C has to return reasonable answers.
1. KeyExtract (id): F selects a user identity id and sends it to the challenger C. C invokes algorithm KeyExtract (msk, id) to get secret key sk id . Then, C returns sk id to F .
2.DelGen(id O , id p , w): F selects the original signer id O , the proxy signer id P , and the warrant w, submits them to the challenger C. C executes KeyExtract(id 0 ) query to get the associated secret sk id O , and then invokes algorithm DelGen(sk id O , id p , w) to get W O→P and returns it to F . Recovering the message from ς, if the following conditions hold:
3.
doesn't occur in the PSign query, his attack is successful.
Let ε 2 be the success probability of F in the game.
Definition 7.
An identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery (IDPSWM) is signature existentially unforgeable against the adaptive chosen message and identity (EUF-ID-CMA), if, for every polynomial time forger F , ε 2 is negligible.
Our Scheme
In this section, we introduce our identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery from lattice assumption. Our scheme includes seven algorithms, which also can be seen from Figure 1 . • Setup(n): Inputting the security parameter n, PKG works as follows:
1. Invoke TrapGen (q, m) algorithm to obtain a pair of matrices (A ∈ Z n×m q , T ∈ Z m×m ). • KeyExtract (msk, id): Given an identity id ∈ {0, 1} * , PKG works as follows:
for some i, j, Resample again. According to [22] , the probability of |E id (i, j)| > 7σ for some i, j is less than 1/30.
Invoke algorithm
3. Return sk id =S id as secret key for the identity id.
• DelGen sk id O , id P , w : The original signer id O inputs his secret key sk id O = S id O , and the warrant w ∈ {0, 1} * associated with proxy signer id P does the following steps:
(z w ) , 1 , and publish
For arbitrary users, he verifies the legality of delegation information d g = (id O , id P , w, W O→P = (z w , c w )) as follows:
and z w ∞ ≤ B, output 1 and accept this delegation. Otherwise, output 0 and reject it.
• PkeyGen sk id P , d g = (id O , id P , w, W O→P = (z w , c w )) : the proxy signer id P inputs his secret key sk id P = S id P and the delegation information
as the delegated secret key.
• PSign(sk O,P,w , ): the proxy signer id P inputs his delegated secret key sk O,P,w = S id P · L w , the message ∈ {0, 1} l 2 , does the next steps.
go to the first step to resample y. Otherwise, return proxy signature ς = (z, c) with probability min
For arbitrary user, he verifies the proxy signature with the next steps. Here, we think the legality of delegation information d g = (id O , id P , w, W O→P = (z w , c w )) has already been verified.
3. If F 1 ( ) = | | l 1 and z ∞ < B, accept the signature and output 1; otherwise, output 0 and reject the signature.
Scheme Analysis
Parameter Setting
n is the system security parameter: 1. For the TrapGen(q, m) algorithm, q = poly (n), m = 6n log q .
For the
3. According to [22] , λ 1 satisfies 2 λ 1 · n λ 1 ≥ 2 128 .
4. According to [23] , l 1 and l 2 are all about 100. 5. According to [22] ,
6. According to [21] , M is a small constant of about 8.
Correctness of the Scheme
Because in step 3 of DelGen sk id O , id P , w algorithm, we have: 
Because in step 5 of PSign(sk O,P,w , ) algorithm, we have:
go to the first step to resample y.
In addition, since y ← D m B , and
Up to now, proxy signature verification is successful. Combining two points, we draw a conclusion that our scheme is correct.
Security Analysis
Our scheme security consists of two parts: EUF-ID-CWA security aims at delegation information reliability, EUF-ID-CMA security aims at proxy signature reliability.
EUF-ID-CWA Security
Theorem 1. Provided that the SIS problem is hard to solve, our identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery (IDPSWM) is delegation information existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen warrant and identity (EUF-ID-CWA).
Proof. We prove this theorem by contradiction. Assuming that a polynomial time forger F has the ability to provide valid and fresh delegation information with some non-negligible probability ε 1 , we can design an algorithm to solve an SIS instance with probability
where Q 1 and Q 2 are the times of H 2 (w ij ) queries and DelGen id i , id j , w ij queries.
That is to say, with an SIS problem instance (A|I n ) ∈ Z n×(m+n) q , C interacts with forger F to find small non-zero vector e = e 1 e 2 , e 1 ∈ Z m and e 2 ∈ Z n , such that (A|I n ) e = (A|I n ) e 1 e 2 = Ae 1 + e 2 = 0 (modq). The details are as follows: 1 √ λ 2 nσ, the probability that every entry in ω is smaller than 2 d−1 − 7λ 1 σ is larger than 1/3. At last, C saves id i , id j , w ij , c ij , z ij in list H 2 and returns c ij to F . 3. KeyExtract (id i ) query: F selects a user identity id i ∈ {o, 1} * and sends it to the challenger C. C searches list H 1 to get (id i , D id i , AS id i + E id i ), and returns sk id i = S id i . If it doesn't exist, C queries H 1 (id i ) firstly. 4 . DelGen id i , id j , w ij query: F selects the original signer id i ∈ {0, 1} * , the proxy signer id j ∈ {0, 1} * , and the warrant w ij ∈ {0, 1} * , sends all of them to C. C looks list H 2 for (id i , id j , w ij , c ij , z ij ) and returns z ij , c ij . If (id i , id j , w ij , c ij , z ij ) doesn't exist, C queries H 2 w ij firstly.
• Forge Phase: The forger F gives his forgery (id i * , id j * , w ij * , W i * →j * = (z * , c * )).
Because F queries H 2 (w ij ) at most Q 1 times, queries DelGen id i , id j , w ij at most Q 2 times, so that the number of c ij is at most Q 1 + Q 2 . Suppose there are c 1 ,
For Az * − H 1 (id i * ) c * (modq), the probability of F generates c * such that c * = H 2 Az * − H 1 (id i * ) · c * (modq) d , w ij * is 1/ 2 128 , which is negligible, so that c * ∈ c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c Q 1 +Q 2 with overwhelming probability 1 − 1/ 2 128 .
Because F gives a successful forgery with probability ε 1 , (id i * , id j * , w ij * , W i * →j * = (z * , c * )) is a valid forgery and c * ∈ c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c Q 1 +Q 2 with probability ε 1 − 1/2 128 . Supposing c * = c t , we further conclude that it comes from a H 2 query rather than a DelGen query.
If c * = c t comes from DelGen id i t , id j t , w ij t query, then
Therefore, w ij * =w ij t , which leads to id i * , id j * , w ij * = id i t , id j t , w ij t (because the warrant includes the identity information), and the entries of A (z * − z t )(modq) are in −2 d , 2 d . If z * = z t , (id i * , id j * , w ij * , W i * →j * = (z * , c * ))= (id i t , id j t , w ij t , W i t →j t = (z t , c t )), it isn't a successful forgery.
If z * = z t , let e 1 = z * − z t , e 2 = −A (z * − z t ) (modq), then Ae 1 + e 2 = 0 (modq), and e 1 ∞ ≤ 2B, e 2 ∞ ≤ 2 d . The SIS instance is solved. Now, we know c * = c t comes from H 2 (w ij ) query, and invoke F again. Due to General Forking Lemma [29] , with a probability not less than
we obtain a different valid delegation information (z,c) on
In addition, S id i * and E id i * have a variety of options, F doesn't know which pair S id i * , E id i * is used to build e 1 and e 2 . Therefore, the probability of (e 1 , e 2 ) = (0, 0) is at least 1/2.
EUF-ID-CMA Security
Theorem 2. Provided that the SIS problem is hard to solve, our identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery (IDPSWM) is signature existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity (EUF-ID-CMA).
Proof. We prove this theorem by contradiction. Assuming that a polynomial time forger F has the ability to provide a valid and fresh proxy signature with some non-negligible probability ε 2 , we can design an algorithm C to solve an SIS problem instance with probability
where Q 3 and Q 4 are the times of H 5 (c) queries and PSign (id i , id j , w ij , c ij , z ij ), k queries.
That is to say, with an SIS problem instance (A|I n ) ∈ Z n×(m+n) q , C interacts with forger F to find a small non-zero vector e = e 1 e 2 , e 1 ∈ Z m and e 2 ∈ Z n , such that (A|I n ) e = (A|I n ) e 1 e 2 = Ae 1 + e 2 = 0 (modq). The details are as follows:
, submits A, F 1 , and F 2 as system parameters to the forger F .
•
Query Phase: The forger F makes the following queries, C gives reasonable answers:
1. H 1 (id i ) query: F selects a user identity id i ∈ {0, 1} * , and sends it to C. C samples 
Replacing H 1 id j * with AS id j * + E id j * , we have
S id i * and E id i * have a variety of options, F doesn't know which pair S id j * , E id j * is used to build e 1 and e 2 . Therefore, the probability of (e 1 , e 2 ) = (0, 0) is at least 1/2.
Performance Analysis
Regarding the performance analysis, we will focus on the following three aspects: signature compression, signing right delegation and message recovery.
Firstly, we take the signature compression technique from [22] . For hash value H 1 (id) for user id, we first sample E id ← D n×n σ such that |E id (i, j)| ≤ 7σ for all i, j = 1, · · · , n. Then, we invoke algorithm S id ← SamplePre (A, T, H 1 (id) − E id , σ) such that AS id + E id = H 1 (id). We set S id rather than (S id , E id ), as the private key of user id. The abandoned E id leads to the signature length reducing from (S id c + y, E id c + y) to S id c + y, which is about n log 14σ (m − 1) λ 1 √ λ 2 bits. Combining the operation a d = (a − [a] 2 d )/2 d , the discarded E id c + y does not affect signature verification algorithm.
For signing right delegation, we make the original signer's signature (z w , c w ) for the warrant w public for everyone. Any verifier can take (w, z w , c w ) to verify the original signer's signing right transfer to the proxy signer. Besides doing the same operations with the verifier, the proxy signer must embed (w, z w , c w ) into the generation of proxy signature private key-the delegated secret key. Therefore, the delegated secret key is decided by the original signer and the proxy signer. The original signer can't deny his authorization to the proxy signer, can't generate the delegated secret key alone, so that proxy signer's interests are protected. On the other hand, the proxy signer can't generate the delegated secret key without the permission of the original signer, thus the interests of the original signer are protected. In addition, no secure channel is necessary between the original signer and proxy signer-because no secret information is transmitted between them.
Thirdly, we use the idea of message recovery signature in [23] , hide the message in the signature, and the message can be recovered without any secret information, hence only the signature should be transmitted and everyone can verify its legality.
In Table 1 , we give the performance comparison between [23] and our scheme. Two schemes are both with message recovery and quantum resistance, and the number of signature verification operations is the same. The differences between two schemes are shown in the following aspects: firstly, the scheme in [23] needs the support of public key infrastructure while our scheme does not need it. Public key infrastructure provides security assurance of the relationship between public key and private key, which is achieved by authoritative authority signing certificates for users. Therefore, public key infrastructure needs to complete certificate allocation, verification, storage and revocation operations, which requires a large amount of bandwidth resources and computing resources. In our scheme, the public key is the user's identity, and the relationship between the public key and the private key is natural. Therefore, we no longer need the support of the complex public key infrastructure, and the system becomes concise. Secondly, the scheme in [23] does not have the function of proxy authorization, and our scheme has this function. Therefore, our scheme is more powerful. In addition, the scheme in [23] does not introduce signature compression technology, and our scheme introduces signature compression technology to make the signature length shorter. It is clear that our scheme has better functionality compared to the scheme in [23] . However, because we take the signature compression technique from [22] to condense signature length, it is necessary to ensure
To this end, we repeat operations of signing message with probability not larger than 2/3-this is our scheme's extra computation cost. For every operation of signing message and verification, our scheme's computation cost is comparable with that of the scheme in [23] .
The lattice-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery in [25] follows the same frame with the scheme in [23] and ours; we also include it in Table 1 . Compared with our scheme, the scheme in [25] bases on public key infrastructure, delegation of signature right depends on secure channel and can't be verified publicly. In addition, the scheme in [25] doesn't take signature compression technique, its signature is longer and the number of signature operations is small. According to [30] , reduction in message length will reduce energy consumption to a greater extent than reduction in computation. Overall, our scheme is more efficient. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we first proposed the identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery based on the lattice assumptions. In particular, we used the signature compression technique for lattice signature without trapdoors to decrease signature length. We abandoned the secure channel between original signer and proxy signer and made the model possess better environmental adaptability. We also divided the security definition into two factors, making the security analysis much easier to be understood. We introduced the idea of message recovery signature, embedding messages into signatures and shortening the amount of information to be transmitted. For security analysis, our scheme is based on the learning with errors and the small integer solution problems. Finally, we demonstrated our performance via comparison with some related works.
